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Truly Humanitarian Intervention: 

Considering just causes and methods in a feminist cosmopolitan frame​[1]​



I. Introduction
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new climate for political philosophy as well as global politics.  With one military superpower in the world today, regional and intra-state conflicts have become the focus of humanitarian concern. International law governing humanitarian intervention and human rights has ascended to prominence in political philosophical discussion after a long period of focus on domestic justice and internal political legitimacy.  It is of paramount importance now to investigate what duties and obligations come with this new world order.  When are violations of human rights sufficient to require an international response?  What should that response be?  Under what conditions may one country justly wield military or economic power to force other countries to respect human rights? What other means of intervening should international law provide or allow? These questions quite plainly raise the danger of ethnocentric and nationalistic bias as well as imperialism.​[2]​  Perhaps less noticed, they also risk androcentric or sexist bias.​[3]​  For, the conduct of war is among the most gendered of all human activities, yet its consequences are universal and profound.  This paper investigates the gendered nature of a part of this emerging political philosophy, namely that portion that concerns intervention for humanitarian ends. I will argue that the scope of philosophical discourse surrounding humanitarian intervention is too narrow to lead to progressive, humanitarian outcomes that serve peace and justice. More specifically, I will argue that political philosophy needs to reinterpret the aims and justification of humanitarian intervention so that international law can be reoriented to serve real human needs.

International law includes two main bodies of codes concerning human rights and intervention, including military intervention: international humanitarian law, which concerns justice in the conduct of war and armed conflict, and human rights law, which applies at all times.  International humanitarian law specifies the conditions under which one nation is justified in waging war on or militarily intervening in the affairs of another.  Situations in which war is justified include: to repel aggression, to come to aid of countries being aggressed upon, and to intervene in severe human rights violations.  Aggressive wars for the self-interest (real or imagined) of a country are never justified, although national leaders often appeal to self-interest in justifying a war to their own people.  International law consists of customary and conventional codes.  The principal conventions of humanitarian law include the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, which deal with international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, respectively.​[4]​ Although most of these provisions apply only during major combat operations, the Fourth Geneva convention in particular applies to post-combat occupation situations.  There are also lower level, international, humanitarian agreements, such as UN Security Council resolutions, that come into play in the waging of armed conflict and military occupation.  Thus, humanitarian intervention is conceived in international law as a part of the laws of war and conflict.
One of the triggering conditions for intervention is to prevent severe human rights violations. Human rights law is framed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, although it is not considered legally binding on states.  Since then that international body has sought to expand and apply human rights doctrine by forging conventional agreements including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  These have the force of law for states that have ratified them, and are customarily seen as at least posing a significant challenge to any decent society to live up to them or justify why they do not.
Military humanitarian intervention is permittedlicensed by the international community and international law to stop genocide, aggressive wars by states on weaker neighbors, or massive human rights violations. (Not to say that this license comes without controversy.) However, there is no internationally recognized doctrine concerning the full range of options for non-military intervention. TI believe that this is unfortunate, both because non-military, social interventions may often be more effective , and because when non-military options are ignored in the humanitarian intervention debate, the debate does not consider some of the harms women suffer at the hands of their own societies, harms which, while real, may not rise to the level of severe human rights violations.​[5]​  
The past decade has seen some further clarification of the international consensus on humanitarian intervention. In December 2001 the Canadian-established International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty issued a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), in which it examined the “right of humanitarian intervention.”​[6]​ The report sets out conditions under which military intervention is justified and perhaps even morally required.  First there must be a just cause, which is the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect its people from mass terror, genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape or forced expulsion.  Second, the intervening military force must have the right intention, in particular, the intention to prevent those forms of violent oppression.  Third, military intervention has to be the last resort, undertaken only after other means have been attempted to prevent catastrophe.  Fourth, only proportional means may be used, that is the force used is to be the minimal force necessary to secure human protection.  Fifth, there must be the reasonable prospects of success of halting the oppression and the expected ill consequences of the military action have to be less than that of not intervening militarily. Finally, the report states that the right authority to license military intervention is the UN Security Council, a claim that I find dubious, but will not directly address in this paper.​[7]​
None of these conditions specifically mention women or any other social group, but this does not mean that they are gender-neutral.  The first (just cause) and fifth (expectation of good consequences) conditions give us a place to begin our investigation of how these rules might have differential consequences for men and women.  First we can ask whether the just causes that are considered are in some sense gendered. Do they include the particular concerns of women, as well as men; does women’s oppression provide a reason for intervention, or are gender-neutral human rights​[8]​ or particularly masculine concerns the only ones that count?  Second, we can ask whether the consequences to be considered in the cost-benefit analysis called for by the final condition include the consequences for women as a group.​[9]​ Furthermore, we can ask whether the entire framework of the “responsibility to protect” has a gendered meaning that should be subjected to critique.





II. Women and Gender in International Law
Until quite recently, international law took account of women specifically only in its requirements on how an occupying force was to provide for the civil protection of civilians. The Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), article 27, states: “Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.  Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.”​[10]​   It is important to note that while it singles out women as particularly vulnerable to sexual violence, the Convention forbids “adverse distinction” or discrimination based on race, religion, or political opinion, but not sex itself.  By not including sex, the Convention in effect permits (or at least excludes as a cause for complaint) adverse distinctions or discrimination that is based on gender or sex, including religiously justified gender apartheid and discrimination, as well as repression of sexual minorities. Of course, the Geneva Convention concerns situations of war, and while sex discrimination or gender apartheid may be wrong, they are not acts of war. Still, one must wonder whether it sends the message that they are lesser wrongs than other forms of discrimination. Given that gender apartheid and discrimination was nearly universally accepted at the time the Geneva Convention was written, it seems likely that its authors accepted that inference.
Much progress has been made for women , however, in other UN treaties and resolutions since that time since the 1949 Geneva Convention. Two are particularly worth mentioning here. First the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (​http:​/​​/​www.un.org​/​womenwatch​/​daw​/​cedaw​/​" \t "_blank​), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979, defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national action to foster greater equality. As of 2012, 187 (of 193) countries had ratified it, (the United States not among them). CEDAW sets principles and standards for realizing women’s rights that are legally binding on the ratifying states, although subject to individual States’ “reservations”. It defines "discrimination against women" as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” Furthermore, it specifically states that States “shall take all appropriate measures… to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.” CEDAW is certainly a comprehensive, progressive statement of and demand for gender equality on behalf of women. It sets a standard for gender equality that no nation in the world yet achieves. 
However, there are two important limits on its applicability in international law. First, it is rarely used to criticize nations that do not live up to its standards. Article 29 provides for the means of resolving disputes within the treaty itself, which is through the International Court of Justice, a provision that has never been used. In 1999 the UN adopted an Optional Protocol for the treaty that allows for additional means of investigation and protest against violations of CEDAW, but these means have been implemented less than a dozen times.​[11]​ Second, it allows for nations to opt out of any of the articles. Now countries are not supposed to opt out of those provisions that go against the very idea of fighting discrimination against women, but that has not stopped many countries from opting out of very basic aspects of gender equality, such as family law provisions that violate Sharia law. Many nations opt out of Article 29, which is the provision for bringing complaints against states at the International Court of Justice, and at present only 103 States are parties to the Optional Protocols.​[12]​ Nonetheless, CEDAW remains an aspirational statement of the gender equality, and gives substance to women’s human rights claims. The second advance relevant to my topic here is Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, adopted in 2000, which calls for greater participation of women in peacekeeping missions and for raising concern for women and gender-based violence in post-conflict situations. This resolution has made modest gains for women to date in terms of their representation in peacemaking and peacekeeping in conflict situations.​[13]​ But again it is important progress to note that full and equal participation of men and women in these post-conflict situations is at least on the agenda of the UN.
Despite this clear progress in international law and recognition of women’s human rights by the UN, however, international law and political philosophy still conceives humanitarian intervention too narrowly to assist in achieving the progressive goals of CEDAW. Although treaties permit some forms of dialogue and critique of states that are parties to them, coercive measures are not permitted except those permitted by the Geneva Conventions and the growing international consensus around R2P. As I argued above, however, the Geneva Convention treats race and religion differently from sex or gender, and R2P focuses on the same severe human rights violations, so does not modify the differential treatment of gender groups that is found in the existing international law licensing humanitarian intervention. What could justify that differential treatment? To answer this question, we need to see how international law is justified.

II. Justifying international law
International law is generally regarded as morally binding on all states and organized groups who wish to be regarded as decent and respect-worthy members of the international community.  Yet the force of this obligation must be provided by a moral argument, and not simply by the force of a proclamation of a self-appointed body, no matter how grand or international in scope.  Furthermore, if international law is to be criticized and repaired, we need to examine the justificatory structure from which it derives.  These conventions and customs are derived primarily from a long history of discussions of just war theory and international relations, and in contemporary thought several types of justifications for its tenets can be found.  One justification is natural law and its descendants’ theories of human rights.  Natural law has a long and varied history, and can be found in religiously based or secular varieties.  Thomas Aquinas is the most important proponent of natural law theory of the Christian variety; Hugo Grotius, a 17th century Dutch thinker, is the most important Christian-inspired natural law theorist concerning the laws of war and peace.  A secular version of this can be found in the work of Michael Walzer, whose Just and Unjust Wars (1977) is the canonical contemporary treatment of just war theory, and in that of Terry Nardin who writes of the implications of “common morality”.​[14]​  Natural law can now be roughly described as a pragmatic, common sense approach to the idea that each person, by nature, deserves dignity and respect.  Walzer calls his theory a “doctrine of human rights,” and explains that his theory is a practical morality that proceeds by the casuistic method.  A second type of justification of international law comes from the social contract tradition, which can be identified in several variants, depending on whether it takes its inspiration from Hobbes or Locke or Kant. John Rawls, in his last book, The Law of Peoples, presents the most significant contemporary argument for the binding nature of international law.



In my view, only the social contract tradition offers a reasonable comprehensive justification of international law.  I will not give an extended argument for this claim here, but simply gesture toward the type of objections I have to natural law.  First, natural law of the religious form cannot be appealed to in a pluralist world, since we cannot assume broad, shared agreements on religiously based assumptions. This is not only an objection to the practical use of international law, but also to the ideal, philosophical justification of law in a situation where the basic truths of religion are unknowable at best, and arguably simply false. The secular natural law option seems likewise unworkable in a situation of pluralism, since it is too ad hoc.  If there is disagreement at some point over what the natural law implies for humanitarian law, there is no foundation to appeal to in order to decide the issue.  Such grounding could work only in a world of broadly shared values about human nature, peace, and justice.  But we do not live in that world, at least not yet. Of particular relevance to my argument, disagreements over the value of individuals vs. community and over the normative implications of religious and sexual difference deeply divide the peoples of the world. Of course, all reasoned argument must begin from some shared assumptions, such as, at minimum, the normative force of principles of logic. But in my view natural law assumes too much, even in its secular variations.

The social contract tradition takes the principles of justice to be the subject of agreement among equal, rational agents representing their own interests. When this theory is extended to international law, some social contract theorists conceive of the principles of international law as an agreement between state parties, while others have continued to view individuals as the parties to the social contract. While Rawls takes the first approach, I will later argue for the second approach. The force of the equality assumption need not be normative, or may be only mildly so. The Hobbesian social contract assumes only that individuals are equal enough and rational enough to pose a lethal threat to each other.  Kant, on the other end of the spectrum, assumes their full moral equality (although he is not so sure about the equal rationality of women).  Feminists, among others, raise a serious concern about this tradition of argument.​[15]​  Contractarianism begins from an assumption of the initial equality of parties to the contract, and lacking equality, inequality will be result of the contract. Yet, the contract tradition, at least on some interpretations of the purpose of the contract, offers a solution: it appeals to ideal conditions and ideal actors to specify principles under which persons or nations interact.  Contractarianism then applies those principles to the actual world.  There is the chance, then, that inequality can be rectified through the principles derived from reasoning from equality.​[16]​  The problem is that the inequalities have to be recognized in advance so that the idealizations can be specified to eliminate the inequality.  Unrecognized or unquestioned inequality will result in preserving the status quo inequality.  Contractarians of the modern period, for example, failed to recognize the injustices done by their political theories to slaves, native peoples, and women.
While the use of contractarian theory to formulate principles of justice in national contexts has been critically addressed by feminists, and its principles redesigned to consider and adopt feminist repairs, feminists have only begun to critically examine the ways in which women’s inequalities have been allowed to remain in the very idealizations of the contract as applied to international justice.​[17]​  As a result, the international rules of just war, just intervention, and just occupation remain gendered in concealed ways, and this gendered nature of the contract produces principles unjust to women. Thus, that what look like justified military interventions and subsequent occupations may unequally affect women in both the near and long term. Although Security Council resolution 1325 is aimed at addressing this point in the practice of conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, it does nothing to realign the fundamental justification of humanitarian intervention, and thus to reform our thinking about when and how to intervene to address human rights violations directed at women. To rectify this, I argue, international humanitarian law needs to be realigned from a feminist perspective.

III. The Law of Peoples: Contractarian derivation and justification of international law



In this section I examine the most influential contemporary contractarian justification of international law, namely Rawls’s Law of Peoples. My aim is to show how gendered assumptions about human rights and just war restrict the meaning and legitimate uses of humanitarian intervention. Although Rawls’s work provides a comprehensive philosophical treatment of international principles of justice, I confine my discussion to the portion concerned with intervention and humanitarian law.  Rawls sets out conditions under which societies (Rawls’s word is “peoples”)​[18]​ can live peaceably with each other (ideal theory), and those conditions under which war is justified (non-ideal theory).  The goal of the theory is to avoid the great evils of the world -- unjust war, oppression, religious persecution, genocide, mass murder, starvation and poverty​[19]​ -- by building just institutions to secure a peaceful world, in which nations do not wage war against each other and human rights are respected throughout the world.  Rawls argues that although it is true that liberal democratic societies tend not to wage aggressive wars nor violate human rights, we cannot legitimately require that all states be liberal democratic ones, merely that they meet a standard of decency requiring respect of human rights and allowing some voice for internal political dissent and change.  In an ideal world consisting of only such decent nations, the basic principles of international justice -- the Law of Peoples -- would be determined by a hypothetical contract situation, a second original position,​[20]​ of suitable representatives of these peoples, behind a veil of ignorance about their nation’s particular features, concerned to secure peace and human rights though rational reflection on reasonable principles.​[21]​  Rawls enumerates eight general principles, among them a duty of non-intervention, a right to wage war only in self-defense and only under specified conditions and limitations, and a duty of assistance to nations living under unfavorable conditions.​[22]​



We do not live in an ideal world in which there are only these tolerable, decent societies, however.  Some nations wage unjust wars on others.  Some nations pose a serious, credible threat to do so.  And some nations violate the human rights of their people.  In these cases, the right to self-defense may lead a nation to go to war, or the duty of assistance may override that of non-intervention. Without going into the main line of argument for all these justifications of war, let us consider just the case under which military intervention in the internal affairs of another country can be justified, namely severe human rights violations.  What constitutes human rights violations, and in particular, the severe ones that justify intervention?  Rawls argues that the human rights that are to be singled out by the Law of Peoples ought not be the same as those rights guaranteed to citizens in a liberal democratic society, since the Law of Peoples is to apply to decent non-liberal societies as well.  He writes that these rights:
express a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.  The violation of this class of rights is equally condemned by both reasonable liberal peoples and decent hierarchical peoples.​[23]​
Why only these urgent rights?  Because any additional rights would not be supported by the decent non-liberal societies that Rawls thinks should be tolerated by the Law of Peoples, and so we have to either condemn those societies, or accept their limitations on the list of human rights.​[24]​  To understand why, then, we have to ask again why we should agree to tolerate such societies.  
The answer, although not stated clearly as such by Rawls, must be that in order to bring about the ideal Society of Peoples, who co-exist peaceably and can be seen to honor human rights, we must restrict the list of human rights to this subset of urgent rights.  The point of the social contract is to construct, not to discover, the principles that, when enforced, secure peace among the contractors.  Thus they must appeal to each, so that each wills them as reasonable grounds for peaceable coexistence.  While some societies will be excluded from the contract, it is important that as many societies be included as possible, so that those outlaw states are isolated and their threat to the Society of Peoples rendered impotent.  



Rawls sketches a type of society that he argues would fit the description of such a decent hierarchical, non-liberal society: a Muslim society he names “Kazanistan”.  Its principal deviation from liberal democratic societies, in Rawls’s description, is that it does not fully respect religious freedom, in the sense that non-Muslims are not permitted to participate in the highest levels of government. We can presume, however, that another significant deviation from liberal democratic rights would be a society that does not respect the rights of women to participate on an equal basis with men in all aspects of social life. Rawls’s invention of a Muslim society as his idea of a possible, decent, non-liberal society, and his failure to even mention the problem of women’s rights under such a regime are, I think, telling.​[25]​
The list of human rights, together with the general principles of international law, implies a specification of the conditions under which military intervention and subsequent occupation maybe waged.  From the list of human rights recognized by the Law of Peoples​[26]​ we may derive two important conditions for feminist consideration: war may not generally be waged to eliminate gender hierarchy, nor may any occupation be extended or force applied in order to secure gender equality.  Feminists, then, must be concerned about the content of international law derived from Rawls’s contractarian argument in The Law of Peoples.  As I suggested earlier, whenever a contractarian argument begins with an inequality in the specification of the contract situation, it is likely not to imply rules of justice that will eliminate that inequality.  But Rawls has assumed nothing about gender in his specification of the contract.​[27]​  Is there an inequality in the second original position that carries through to the principles of international justice?
For feminists, the first sign of trouble comes from a casual glance at the index to Law of Peoples.  Here we see that “women” occurs only three times, twice to mention that by giving women greater rights to education and bodily autonomy, population can be effectively controlled without state coercion. The one time that women are taken up for their own political sake, so to speak, occurs on p. 75, where Rawls writes: 



A third observation concerns the representation in a consultation hierarchy of members of society, such as women, who may have long been subjected to oppression and abuse, amounting to the violation of their human rights.  One step to ensure that their claims are appropriately taken into account may be to arrange that a majority of the members of the bodies representing the (previously) oppressed be chosen from among those whose rights have been violated.  As we have seen, one condition of a decent hierarchical society is that its legal system and social order do not violate human rights.  The procedure of consultation must be arranged to stop all such violations.
To understand this passage, we need first to understand its context in the book. This is the third of three observations that Rawls makes regarding what he calls decent consultation hierarchies. In the first observation he explains that in such societies, groups rather than individuals exercise their voices in the society through some sort of scheme of consultation. Each person belongs to a group and is represented to the ruling body of the society by some number within their group. The second observation explains that there must be some minimal religious toleration, not necessarily amounting to equality, in a decent society. This discussion of allowable religious hierarchy then leads to the quoted passage. Recalling the earlier list of urgent human rights violations, which suggests that oppression must amount to slavery or serfdom in order for it to count as a one of those human rights violation. What would he say about not being allowed to be seen in public without a male relative as an escort, or not being allowed to be seen without a full body and face covering? Given that Rawls’s discussion of Kazanistan does not mention the problems of women’s rights under existing Islamic rule, we must infer that merely sanctioning a custom of gender apartheid, but perhaps even Sharia law, does not amount to human rights violations. It may be that women do not even constitute a group, as the passage listing human rights suggests by the absence of the word gender. If not, however, the violations of their rights that are inherent in the practice of religion in the society, at least as they see it, will surely not count as human rights violations. In short, Rawls evinces no urgency or extreme caution to secure women’s rights.
Martha Nussbaum offers a related critique of Rawls on the question of women’s rights under the Law of Peoples.​[28]​ Nussbaum argues that women’s rights are sacrificed to the contract because the individuals who are party to the contract are not persons but peoples, and thus it is the peoples as groups who are offered equal respect and dignity. However, she points out, if the group has a tradition of ignoring women’s equal dignity, through such things as unequal divorce and inheritance laws, the Law of Peoples will have no recourse against that group. In effect, then, the Law of Peoples will sanction (that is, allow) the oppression of women. Now this could happen to men or other social groups if a society that is considered decent by Rawls’ criteria still oppresses them in ways that fall below the threshold of severe human rights violations.  But as it happens, the list of severe human rights violations that Rawls offers seems to cover most oppression of social groups that include men.​[29]​ Thus, oppression of women seems not to be one of the justifying conditions for intervention, unless that oppression amounts to a kind of oppression that is typically suffered by men. 
Well, most feminists are not keen to see military interventions, either.​[30]​ However, these constraints on war are also the constraints on the limits of assistance under occupation. O -- once the violations of (what the Law of Peoples regards as) human rights have ended, there is no duty nor is it permissible to continue occupation.  Rawls argues specifically against liberal societies making any intervention or provision of incentives for non-liberal societies to become more liberal, on the grounds that this fails to adequately respect those societies.  Such intervention or even incentive provision is likely, he argues, to cause resentment and thus disturb international peace. Rawls insists that societies must equally respect all societies that meet the minimal standards of decency. Against the notion that liberal rights must be urged on others he writes that “if liberal peoples require that all societies be liberal and subject those that are not to politically enforced sanctions, then decent liberal peoples – if there are such – will be denied a due measure of respect by liberal peoples.”​[31]​ Rawls opposes any form of political pressure to liberalize decent, hierarchical societies. Hence, women’s specific concerns that do not rise to the level of urgent human rights violations are not recognized by Rawls as a legitimate reason for any form of intervention. 
To summarize, we can raise two criticisms of Rawls’s account of humanitarian intervention. First, Rawls sets the bar for any intervention at the level of the urgent rights violation that justifies military intervention. He does this because the goal is to secure peace among Peoples, and to include among those Peoples as many societies as possible consistent with that aim. This is a general problem for agents seeking to promote humanitarian ends across national borders. Second, human rights violations that are seen as meeting this standard are not those associated with women (or men) as a group, but rather with ethnic and religious groups. Yet such groups often themselves harbor norms and customs that discriminate against women. Feminist political philosophy therefore must offer an alternative account of intervention that can truly be called “humanitarian.”

IV. An Alternative Justification for Humanitarian Intervention
Constructing an alternative account requires us to examine where the justification of intervention goes wrong and to seek to repair or replace that justification. There are two basic problems with Rawls’s construction of the contract situation.  First in taking “Peoples” to be the parties to the contract that determines the principles of international justice, he begins with nations, rather than individuals, as the morally politically primary units. This beginning is expedient, but mistaken on both ontological and moral grounds.​[32]​ It is human individuals who live, experience, suffer, and die. Furthermore, an individual can survive her People, but not vice versa. Thus individuals must be ontologically prior to Peoples, but they are also morally prior. Peoples can only be said to live or suffer or experience anything through their individuals. The death of a People is no more than the death of all of its individuals and their collective actions and projects, but it may be a lot less, if, say the individual persons who compose a People abandon that way of life to live what they consider to be better ones among other groups. While it is no doubt true that individual human beings find meaning only in and through their communities, there would be no meaning-providing institutions or norms without the actions and intentions of individual human beings. Finally, if we had to choose between saving an individual human being and saving other aspects of the non-human individual components of a People, it would be monstrousodd to say that we should opt to save the latter. It would have to mean that the loss of the non-human individual components be so valuable to so many individuals that this loss overwhelms the loss of the life of the human individual. But in that case it is because of the high value that individuals have for those components, which shows that it is the value to individuals that we find morally important.  If we grant that individuals are ontologically and morally primary, and if we accept the equality of individuals regardless of their national identity, then the principle of non-intervention, even as a prima facie duty, is open to question.​[33]​  
The other main problem with Rawls’s view is that he assumes that the goal to be attained through the law of peoples is peace.  While peace appeals to both nations and individuals, I want to suggest that there is a more primary aim for individuals, and that is autonomy. By autonomy I mean the ability to one rationally plan one’s life and live according to a moral code that one can see reasons for in recognition of our inescapable human interdependency. Autonomous persons live their own lives in the recognition that they are social beings among others also striving to live their own lives. Feminist work on relational autonomy has shown us the importance of recognizing our non-voluntary ties to others that make human life rich and meaningful.​[34]​ However, we must also recognize that Ssocial circumstances can be so constraining that they rule this out,out a rich and meaningful life, and oppression or war are prime examples of such circumstances. POn this view persons’ autonomy can be compromised by their social circumstances. Autonomy is thus both a social and an individual achievement. Thus, if the parties to the social contract that determines the principles of international justice represent individual persons rather than Peoples, it would be reasonable to expect them to aim for autonomy for themselves and to expect others to do so as well. Peace and security, of course, are still very important instrumentally to individuals. If we take this moral cosmopolitan​[35]​ perspective of adopting individual autonomy as the primary goal of international justice, we can see that its achievement will be enhanced by global peace.
Cosmopolitanism need not deny that individuals find communities and community life meaningful.​[36]​ Collective self-determination of the community’s norms and rules is valuable to individuals, and hence it has instrumental moral value. But the instrumental value of collective self-determination cannot ground a strict principle of non-intervention when individual moral rights are threatened, (a point that Rawls also acknowledges). The principle of non-intervention must be weighed against other instrumental values for individuals, including rights and other goods as well. 
I propose a contractarian approach to the international law governing humanitarian intervention that takes human individuals to be the parties to the contract and thus adopts as its aim maximizing individual autonomy, understood as the ability of each to live their own lives in the recognition that they are social beings essentially connected to others also striving to live their own lives. Given autonomy as the aim, when would intervention ever be justified? In the individual case, intervention might can be justified when an individual’s life is so constrained or disordered that autonomy is not achievable without intervention. The aim of achieving autonomy also sets the limits on the kinds and methods of intervention that are justifiable. So, I shall argue, in the intercultural or international case, when individuals are systematically constrained or unable to achieve autonomy, intervention will be warranted, if the intervention itself does not constrain autonomy to an even greater degree. Thus,  But the aim of achieving autonomy will again set the limit on the kinds and methods of intervention that are justifiable.
In a recent paper, Steven Lee argues for a similar justificatory structure for military humanitarian intervention.​[37]​ I want to adopt his balancing procedure, but argue that there is no reason to restrict it to the realm of military humanitarian intervention.  Lee’s structure allows us to justify other forms of coercive humanitarian intervention that fall short of military force.  Furthermore, this structure allows us to consider all human rights violations, including those of particular concern to women, as possibly licensing intervention of some sort.  
On Lee’s view, coercion in the international sphere should be justified in the same way as it is in the national domestic sphere, namely to protect rights. But the scope of permissible military humanitarian intervention turns out on Lee’s analysis to be just as limited as it is on standard international law by the kind of cost-benefit analysis that the potential intervener should engage in. Specifically, Lee thinks that such considerations lead to two types of limitations. Efficiency limitations consider the ability of the intervening power to succeed in protecting human rights and the material costs of intervening. Rights-balancing limitations consider the need of the intervening power to violate rights in order to succeed in protecting human rights and the tendency of the intervening power to become oppressive even when promoting some human rights. These limitations on military intervention turn out to be so restrictive that it is justified only in those cases where there are massive human rights violations by a state that is so disordered as to be incapable of mounting a serious defense of its national sovereignty.  
Lee’s example test cases are Rwanda in 1994, Iraq in 2003, and Rawls’s mythical Kazanistan, which he so ranks in order of severity of human rights violations. Lee agrees with the standard view that there should be no intervention in Kazanistan because he agrees with Rawls that there are no serious human rights violations there – it is a decent non-liberal society. Lee’s analysis also agrees with military intervention in Rwanda because of the great benefits of avoiding extreme crimes against humanity. Lee argues against the Iraq invasion, against those who would try to justify it as a legitimate case of military humanitarian intervention, because of the consequences that could have been expected to ensue and which have in fact been borne out.  Briefly he argues that the US and Coalition forces should have foreseen the strong military response to military invasion that would cause so much death and destruction and should have therefore regarded this as an overriding reason against intervention. Although he claims that there are no clear rules for when military humanitarian intervention is justified, since each case must be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis, Lee summarizes his general view as follows: “Given the grim consequences of war and the risk that a general rule might be misused or abused by powerful states to rationalize military adventures it may be appropriate to accept a defeasible rule that [military humanitarian intervention] is justified only when severe and widespread rights violations are in progress.”​[38]​
I agree with Lee’s cosmopolitanism and his balancing of efficiency and rights limitations in justifying humanitarian intervention. However, he does not go far enough in either the direction of measuring the potential benefits of humanitarian interventions or the costs of military interventions. To accurately assess both the benefits and the costs we need to frame the analysis with a feminist cosmopolitan lens. By this I mean we need to take into account the effects of war on women as well as on men, from the perspective of autonomy as the essential goal. Instead of asking as Lee does, “when should coercive force be used to protect human rights?” I shall ask “when should intervention (of some sort) be used to promote autonomy?” 
Consider the costs of military humanitarian interventions. These include the killed and wounded on all sides, as well as the damage to the environment and economy of the invaded country; these are the only costs that Lee considers.  We should also consider additional or new types of rights and autonomy violations that are introduced or facilitated by the intervention.  Interventions often upset the social balance of power among social groups.  Of course this is often the aim of an intervention: to remove or disempower a group that is oppressing another group in the society. However, there are also unintended effects in this regard. The kinds of examples I have in mind are between men and women, although in specific cases it may be between different religious sects, economic classes, or perhaps other groups. I would categorize such changes in the balance of power as important considerations, but they are not included among the rights-balancing considerations raised by Lee, where the intervening power infringes on rights. Interventions may intentionally or unintentionally give one part of the society unfair additional power or privilege.  Consider the cases of interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan, where women have clearly suffered great losses of power vis-à-vis men as a result of the military conflicts, which in turn have caused human rights violations and the imposition of laws that are opposed to the equality of women. I will call these autonomy considerations, because they involve compromises ofto the autonomy of members of social groups.
Moreover, this suggests that there needs to be greater attention to the results of military action in itself. Militarization tends to hyper-masculinize a society and may lead to greater death and oppression from that fact itself.​[39]​  Military intervention makes violent, lethal force the typical response to disagreement in a society, at least for some time.  Since men have a near monopoly on lethal force in most societies (by possessing and wielding, whether legally or illegally, the vast majority of weapons), they tend to strengthen their power and hold on social and political power when lethal force is the currency of power. Iraq under the (just ended) U.S. occupation illustrates this point well. Women have been kidnapped, raped, and killed in honor killings in significant numbers; they are less safe on the streets of Iraq than they were before the U.S. invasion, which was already a very bad time for them.​[40]​ Women are understandably reluctant to go out of their homes without a male escort for fear of violence.​[41]​ The assailants include a nasty mix of released felons, whom Saddam Hussein released just before the U.S.-led invasion, religious fanatics who harass women, and gangs who seek to secure control over their turf or seek revenge through rape and killings in what became a largely ethnic-religious conflict. Prostitution became rampant, and women were kidnapped and sold as sex slaves.  Furthermore, religious rules, such as the rule that women must cover their hair with a hijab or in some parts of Iraq even wear an abaya, are being enforced on women by Shiite clerics,​[42]​ and many women are wearing them out of fear of violence on the streets.  Women who are raped are no safer in their own homes, as they face the prospect of their own families killing them to protect family honor.​[43]​  Many women have had to quit their jobs because their husbands demand it or because their places of work have been closed under the crackdown of conservative religious fanaticism, or because of the breakdown of the public sector since the war. Whether at the hands of criminals, tribal leaders, or family members, women have lost rights and freedoms in Iraq.
Iraqi women were made particularly vulnerable by the U.S. led intervention for reasons that are general to occupations after humanitarian intervention and reasons specific to the situation of Iraq.  Women are generally made more vulnerable to rape as a result of the unrest caused by military intervention.  Furthermore, military defeat constitutes an affront to the honor of the defeated men, who then feel that their honor must be proven and upheld in other ways, such as through commanding absolute obedience from their women.  As we have learned from the wars in Bosnia and Croatia (to mention only recent examples), rape is means of conducting civil war/ethnic conflict, and it seems to be a means employed in Iraq now by ethnic gangs who wish to sully the honor of their rivals by raping “their” women.  Lastly, women’s ill treatment is exacerbated by the presence of male soldiers.  The situation of Iraqi women is worse than it was before the U.S. humanitarian intervention, and the intervention is in large part responsible for their worsened situation.​[44]​  
This loss of women’s rights and power, and therefore in many cases their autonomy, in conflict and post-conflict situations should be considered among the costs in weighing the costs and benefits of interventions. These considerations weigh heavily against military force as a legitimate means of intervening. But we need not therefore conclude that this is where the considerations of international law cease.  Since all aspects of human rights are legitimately a concern of international law, and since we have rejected the non-intervention principle, we can now consider non-military state interventions as a legitimate subject for international law.  A continuum of coercive force may be considered in humanitarian intervention, where military force is only one end point of this continuum, as well as a continuum of rights violations as justifying conditions for interventions.  As Catherine Lu has argued, “we should be careful not to conflate the problem of intervention with the problem of the use of force…. The conflation of these two issues in international theory and practice has meant that governments have been able to claim a much stronger social convention against all types of intervention than is supported even in international law…. Many situations may justify some kind of interventionary international response that violates or restricts some aspect of a state’s sovereign authority while ruling out a full-scale military assault.”​[45]​ Given the serious costs of military intervention, non-military humanitarian interventions must be prioritized in most cases of even the most severe human rights violations.  For state actors​[46]​, the following might be a reasonable start on a list of intervention strategies from least to most coercive:
1.	diplomatic persuasion  
2.	support for non-violent internal resistance groups 
3.	diplomatic criticism  
4.	propaganda  
5.	economic incentives (targeted subsidies or grants in return for progressive reforms)
6.	economic sanctions (trade restrictions, etc.) 
7.	total embargoes
8.	support for violent internal resistance 
9.	military intervention aimed at preventing killing
10.	military intervention aimed at removing governmental authority
In this way the different levels of cost and risk can be weighed against the benefits foreseen by the intervention. Many of the gender injustices that I am most concerned with are probably best responded to with intervention strategies of type 2, support for non-violent internal resistance groups. This is also the kind of intervention that non-state actors will be most likely to be able to (and to legitimately) engage in. Where there are such internal groups, supporting their autonomous resistance has the benefit of not only combating oppressors but also of building autonomy of survivors, and is likely to progressively transform a society rather than simply prevent current oppressions. Much more needs to be said about what it means to provide that kind of support, but that is beyond the scope of the present essay. My concern here is to argue for the recognition of this sort of preventive non-violent intervention in international law itself.​[47]​ It must be noted that the second half of this continuum, beginning with economic sanctions, all involve lethal force and so must be considered as types of violent intervention, with all of the autonomy considerations that follow from that, particularly for women. Furthermore, as Laura Sjoberg has argued, economic sanctions have serious, gendered consequences for the targeted population.​[48]​ Such lethal interventions can only be justified by equally serious causes to intervene. Hence, a full assessment of which sort of intervention is warranted must include consideration of the benefits of these potential interventions.
 	Some feminists object to this kind of reorientation of international law that would permit more intervention. Tara McCormack argues that broadening the scope of justified intervention, as recommended by the R2P framework or by my argument, serves to “entrench existing power inequalities rather than challenge them.” She argues that although re-characterizing sovereignty as responsibility rightly challenges the notion of sovereignty, it “potentially allows powerful states or international institutions greater freedom to intervene in and regulate weaker states,” which “serves to disempower the citizens of weak or impoverished states,” and to “de-politicize intervention and regulation as they are reinterpreted as a moral obligation for the powerful.”


V. Justifying causes for intervention: oppressive social norms
Social norms and customs that inhibit women’s autonomy can, under my proposal, justify intervention in cases where international law would previously have prohibited it. If autonomy is the legitimate goal for intervention, then our respectful, hands-off approach to the mythical Kazanistan needs to be re-considered, if, as I suppose in the example, the women of Kazanistan are confined to the domestic sphere or treated unequally, whether by custom or by law. Such customs or laws amount to gender apartheid if women are prohibited from moving about freely and taking up occupations and social positions among men.​[49]​ This and other forms of gender discrimination and gender violence – many practiced in the West and by fundamentalist Christian groups as well -- are serious violations of human rights, but the masculinism of political philosophy tends to make us overlook these when they are seen as religious, or religiously inspired, customs and traditions. Fundamentalist versions of many world religions privilege men as a group and constrain women’s autonomy. They may portray women as seductive temptresses, or weaker, inferior beings to be protected and confined, and so harm women by giving them an inferior self-image and making it difficult to move confidently in the world.  
One might object that the kind of harm done to women by religion in this way is not severe: psychological oppression in the form of internalized inferiority and acceptance of norms that continue their oppression are not as serious as death.  It certainly does not rise to the level of genocide; and may not generate serious human rights violations if the norms are not violently resisted by the women themselves. But we must consider that such oppression is passed on through generations of humanity, and there is therefore a kind of compound interest involved in the disutility of this harm over the generations.  Women of Kazanistanunder sexist regimes (on the assumption that it is one of these fundamentalist religious states) may not get out from under this oppressive, sexist regimethis oppression for 20 generations.  In that case we have 20 generations liveing stunted, restricted half-lives, and that may begin to sound comparable to the cutting short of the lives of a single generation.  And this is only to count the psychological harm to the women themselves.  Since the material well-being of societies in which women are subject to gender apartheid (and therefore lowered education and ability to affect the public sphere) is also much lower, this underestimates the actual harms done.  But more to the point of the present paper, a human rights violation need not rise to the level of genocide if non-military intervention strategies are also under consideration.
The actual situation of women in the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations shows that the practical application of humanitarian law in actual occupations of outlaw societies that seriously oppress women can make the situation of women even worse than before the occupation.  But the lesson of Kazanistan and the many real world societies that resemble it in the way that women are confined is that we tend to be blind to the kinds of human rights violations that rob women of autonomy under the guise of custom or religion.  Furthermore, liberal ideology considers those to be private choices by individuals, and therefore not a concern of an intervening or occupying force charged with helping to devise public institutions to achieve internal security.  Family, community, religion are values to men and women alike, and so seem to be the kinds of things that human rights law should aim to protect.  Yet, as feminists have long argued, they are also both the sites of women’s daily lives, and the sites in which they are most often violated and abused.  When women must choose from a bargaining position that is unequal, their choices are between bad and worse: choose this traditional religion/family structure, or none.  This is the case not only in war and occupation, but also in times and places of so-called peace. While it seems to make sense that interventions should not interfere in those valuable traditional institutions, on a deeper analysis that apparent truth gives way. 
Kazanistan is a mythical state, and so a full assessment of the potential benefits of humanitarian intervention would be speculative at best.  I am not arguing that military humanitarian intervention is warranted wherever there is gender apartheid, of course, since militarization is likely to make matters even worse for the women who are already suffering human rights violations.  I am suggesting that the violation of autonomy in a state in which gender apartheid is practiced for generations is massive and may warrant some form ofs intervention.  The idea that intervention should aim to support autonomy may seem paradoxical.  When one intervenes one is disrupting a process, often one that has been voluntarily embarked upon.  Intervention in collective decision making or collective self-determination would itself seem to be a violation of autonomy.  However, when some individuals are prevented from freely participating in collective decision making, then the paradox of intervening in collective decisions to achieve autonomy dissolves.  The collective decision process itself is the violation of autonomy, and intervention in that process may reinstate the individuals’ autonomy.  Collective processes that deny autonomy should be subject to intervention. Autonomy- inhibiting social norms and traditions may be supported by some and resisted by others. Deciding how to intervene to support autonomy in these situations without violating it is a difficult question, and beyond the scope of this essay.​[50]​ 
Let me then propose alternative conditions on intervention to the ones proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which might be proposed by a mythical “International Commission on Intervention and Cosmopolitan Autonomy”.  These would be conditions that any group must meet if it intervenes within the borders of a foreign state. 
1.	Just cause:  the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect its people from mass terror, genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape or forced expulsion, or systematic and serious violations of individual autonomy.  
2.	The intervening group must have the right intention, in particular, the intention to prevent those forms of oppression and to build capacities for individual autonomy.  
3.	Intervention strategies must be attempted in order, so that military intervention is the last resort. 
4.	The force used is to be the minimal intervention necessary to support and defend human autonomy for all individuals.  
5.	There must be the expectation of good consequences: there has to be a reasonable chance of halting the oppression and supporting autonomy, and the expected ill consequences of the intervention for autonomy have to be less than that of not intervening at all.
 
VI. Conclusion
If we were to take seriously the oppression of women, including the suppression of autonomy by ordinary social institutions, then we would see the estimation of the costs and the benefits of humanitarian intervention as more complex than those typically considered by either just war theory or political philosophy more generally.  As under the standard just war view or Lee’s theory, we could agree that military intervention is rarely warranted, but we would see failure to intervene at all as more costly than previously considered, as well.
Military intervention and occupation in seriously disordered states that also have a tradition of discrimination against women are likely to lead to worse consequences for women, even if peace and order are restored, if it isthey are brokered on masculine terms.  Yet, from a feminist perspective it is also not acceptable to say that no intervention can ever be warranted.  Indeed, feminists might insist that intervention is warranted in many more (or different) situations than current political thought seems to justify.  The emphasis in international law on military intervention is misguided, however.  International law informed by a feminist perspective requires that new means of social intervention, which disrupt traditional roles and gender hierarchies, must be considered to replace military intervention which tends to maintain the global dominance of military power over the freedom of autonomous individuals and of men over women.  By putting all these forms on a single continuum, we can begin to see that there exist many options for intervention and many more situations where intervention is both required and permitted.
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